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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY MULHERIN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent.) 
Case No. 17027 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a strict liability action instituted by 
Wesley Mulherin for damages caused by accidental activation 
of an air winch manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand Company. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judgment on the jury's Verdict was entered by the 
District Court on November 29, 1979 following trial. An Order 
denying plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial was entered on March 31, 
1980. Plaintiff appeals from both the Judgment and the Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant Wesley Mulherin was at the time of 
his accident an underground miner employed by Anaconda Copper 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Company at Anaconda's Carr Fork mine near Tooele, Utah. 
Mr. Mulherin worked on an apparatus known as a '1galloway", 
a multi-level device which is used in the construction of 
vertical mine shafts. The various decks of the galloway 
contain equipment used in drilling, blasting, removing debris 
and cementing as shaft sinking progresses. That equipment 
includes certain compressed air-driven winches which are used 
to raise and lower mucking devices which are suspended from the 
bottom of the galloway known as "crydermen." When in operation, 
the crydermen are lowered to the shaft bottom by means of a 
cable attached to one of the winches. When not in use, the 
crydermen are raised to a position directly below the bottom 
level of the galloway by the same means. 
Innnediately after Mr. Mulherin came on shift 
October 29, 1977 and descended to the galloway, he and another 
miner undertook to free a ten-inch diameter hose attached to 
the bottom of a large sediment tank used to allow settling of 
liquid pumped from the shaft bottom. The sediment tanks was 
I 
located underneath one deck of the galloway and above the air 
winches used for raising and lowering the crydermen. When 
settling had occurred, water was pumped from the tank to the 
surface, and the remaining sediment was discharged over a side 
rail of the galloway by means of the hoses into the bottom of 
the shaft where the crydermen would later muck it into buckets 
for removal to the surface. 
-2-
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When the sediment-draining operation was not in 
progress, the hoses wer~ hung to the sides of the tank by 
means of chains in such a manner that the tank would hold 
water and sediment pumped from the shaft bottom. The particular 
hose being detached from the side of the settling tank and 
maneuvered toward the galloway rail for discharge of sediment 
into the shaft by Mr. Mulherin and his co-worker was attached 
to 'the settling tank almost directly above one of the crydermen-
raising air winches manufactured by the defendant Ingersoll-Rand. 
The practice of the miners who performed the sediment draining 
operation was to stand on the winch in order to detach chains 
holding the drainage hoses in place, then descend from the winch 
to the galloway floor at that level and maneuver the hose toward 
and over the rail. During that operation the hose came in contact 
with the winch's throttle-control handle, set the winch into 
operation unexpectedly, and plaintiff's injury resulted. 
Mr. Mulherin filed his Complaint against Ingersoll-
Rand Company on July 27, 1978 alleging that the winch, and 
particularly its throttle-control device, was dangerously 
defective as designed and manufactured by defendant. The jury 
returned a Special Verdict and found that: (1) The product was 
dangerously defective, that the defect proximately caused 
plaintiff's injury, and (2) the product was being misused, and 
that such misuse was a proximate cause of plaintiff~s injury. 
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The trial court had determined that of the two 
available defenses misuse, if proven, was a complete bar 
to plaintiff's strict liability claim, whereas assumption 
of risk, if proven, was to be compared to the product defect! 
The court accordingly entered judgment of No Cause of Action, 
The jury was not allowed to compare the contribution of misuse 
to the product defect. There was no finding of assumption of 
risk. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in its instructions and 
Special Verdict submitted to the jury with respect to whether 
findings of misuse or assumption of risk are complete bars to 
recovery or are to be compared with any finding of defendant~s 
fault in designing and manufacturing a dangerously defective 
product which was a proximate cause of the accident? 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant 
plaintiff a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, 
the newly discovered evidence being plaintiff's suppressed 
subconscious recollection of the accident sequence elicited 
under hypnosis following trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO APPLICATION 
OF THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MISUSE, 
AND THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM SUBMITTED 
TO THE JURY REFLECTED AN INACCURATE 
VIEW OF THE LAW PREJUDICIAL TO 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
The recognized defenses to strict liability claims 
in Utah are two and only two, they being "misuse" and "assumption 
of risk." Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979) 
fn. 5. The trial court instructed the jury regarding both 
defenses. Unfortunately, the instructions given were not proper 
in their manner of application of those defenses to a strict 
liability case. In the trial court's jury Instruction No. 17, 
the defense of "misuse" was defined. In paragraphs 3 and 4 
of the Special Verdict, the jury was required to answer special 
interrogatories concerning misuse. Both the Instruction and 
Special Verdict form constitute error by the trial court for 
the reason that there was no application of the principles of 
comparative fault to the defense of misuse. That such failure 
constitutes error is clearly seen by examining and comparing 
the Instructions and Special Verdict paragraphs dealing with 
the defense of }!assumption of risk." Jury Instructions 18 and 
19, along with Special Verdict paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 do 
reflect a proper application of the principles of comparative 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fault to the "assumption of risk" defense in a strict products 
liability case. 
This court, in its opinion recognizing strict liability 
as the law in Utah, Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., Id., specified 
"misuse" and "assumption of risk" as the two strict liability 
defenses, and expressly declined to address the issue of applica-
tion of comparative fault principles to either or both. 
We need not-and do not-reach the issue 
here, because of the unavailability to 
defendant of either of these two defenses, 
of whether comparative principles should 
apply in strict products liability cases, 
where one of these two defenses lies, in 
order to diminish recovery by plaintiff, 
or whether proof by defendant of one of 
these two defenses bars recovery altogether. 
601 P.2d 152 at 158, 159 (footnote omitted). 
While this, court has not determined whether the two 
defenses should be applied with comparative principles or not, 
clearly they should operate in tandem, not separately, as 
either total bars to recovery or as fault to be compa~ed to 
the defect to diminish plaintiff's recovery as in other cases 
of comparative fault. In other words, both defenses must be 
total bars or both must be compared. In the instant case, 
"misuse" was considered by the trial court to be a bar, and 
"assumption of risk'' was to be compared. Such an application 
of the defenses violates the spirit of the principal case 
addressing the issue, that being Daly v. General Motors Coru., 
575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978). The Daly case was cited favorably 
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by this court on other issues in Hahn, and on this issue by 
the respondents in their pleadings below. In Daly, the 
California Supreme Court stated: 
If a more just result follows from [this] 
expansion of comparative principles, we 
have no hesitancy in seeking it, mindful 
always the fundamental and underlying 
purpose of Li [v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 
1126 (Cal. 1976)] ·was to promote the 
equitable allocation of loss among all 
parties legally responsible in proportion 
to their fault. 
575 P.2d 1162 at 1169. The court went on to quote favorably 
from the proposed Uniform Comparative Fault Act: 
[,](a) In an action based on fault to 
recover damages for injury or death to 
person ... any contributory fault 
chargeable to the claimant diminishes 
proportionately the amount awarded ... 
but does not bar recovery . . . . [Emphasis 
added.] 
575 P.2d 1162 at 1172. 
The effect of the trial court's misappliation of 
comparative fault principles is clear: The jury found there 
was a dangerous defect that proximately caused plaintiff's injury 
and that plaintiff's conduct also was a proximate cause of those 
injuries. We therefore have a classic case for determination 
of comparative fault, yet, by reason of the court's Instructions 
and Special Verdict form, Mr. Mulherin is totally barred from 
recovery. The jury was not allowed to apportion fault, as it 
would have in the event of a finding that plaintiff assumed the 
risk but had not misused the product, 
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It can be seen by examination of the cited cases 
which support application of comparative fault to strict 
products liability that courts are concerned with apportioning 
fault among the parties by applying the degree of relative 
fault found by the trier-of-fact to the amount of plaintiff's 
damages. The type of plaintiff fault, whether designated 
"misuse" or "a.ssumption of risk" should make no difference 
if the objective is to determine degrees of relative fault. 
Neither should the fact that plaintiff's cause of action is 
designated "strict liability" rather than "negligence" affect 
the application of comparative principles. Fault is the concern, 
and the name applied to either party's fault should not affect 
the outcome of the litigation. 
By this appeal the appellant is urging upon the 
court application of comparative principles to all tort 
situations, regardless whether they arise from claims of 
negligence or strict liability. The defenses to strict 
liability, "misuse" and "assumption of risk", are too little 
understood in their meaning for the trial court's position to 
be workable. Conceivably, manufacturers could argue to a jury 
that if a user assumed the risk of danger of a particular product 
created, he was "misusing" the product because the manufacturer 
never foresaw that the product would be used with such knowledge 
of its dangerous defect. Such an argument would effectively 
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circumvent the spirit of application of comparative principles 
to "assumption of risk" by the Utah Legislature in negligence 
cases. Comparative Negligence Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78•27-37 
(1953). 
The logical answer is a uniform application of 
comparative principles to strict liability defenses. A contrary 
position is bound to create confusion and overlapping of the 
defenses, which would frustrate the intent of the legislature 
and the progressive weight and spirit of the law. 
POINT II 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS 
PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT AFTER 
TRIAL, UPON WHICH APPELLANT'S 
NOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
In order for this court to appreciate the effect of 
the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial, certain back-
ground information must be provided. 
Plaintiff was the only eyewitness to the accident in 
which his left leg was torn off by the accidental activation 
of defendant's winch. He testified at trial that, as he 
recalled, he had been standing on the winch working with a 
sediment tank drain hose and chains when the winch began to 
operate. As the trial progressed, it became apparent that 
plaintiff could not have been standing on the winch at that 
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time for the reasons that because of the direction of rotation 
of the winch he would have (a) lost the other leg and (b) come 
to rest on his front and not his back side. The.jury's finding 
of misuse was based upon plaintiff's own testimony regarding 
his recollection of standing on the winch when the accident 
sequence began. It was necessary to climb on the winch to 
perform a part of the tank drainage task assigned to plain-
tiff before his accident, and plaintiff had been on the winch 
for that purpose at some point in time. 
Following trial, plaintiff was examined in detail 
by a clinical hypnotist who found (see Affidavit of Charlotte 
Morrow, Record) that the events which preceded the accident 
were suppressed by plaintiff's conscious mind because of the 
terrible emotional trauma of watching as his leg was torn off, 
but that an accurate memory of those events was retained in 
plaintiff's subconscious. By means of relatively shallow 
hypnosis that memory was retrieved, and discloses that plaintiff 
was not standing on the winch, but had descended and was standing 
on the galloway floor performing another part of the tank draining 
task when the accident sequence began. The observations of plain· 
tiff's co-worker, Elmer Mondragon (see Affidavit of Elmer 
Mondragon~ Record) are consistent with plaintiff's subconscious 
recall of the accident sequence. 
The affidavits of Morrow and Mondragon demonstrate 
that plaintiff's accident did not occur in the manner he 
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consciously thought it had and to which he testified at trial. 
Detailed recall of those events extracted from Mr. Hulherin's 
subconscious memory through recognized and scientific means 
makes it quite apparent that plaintiff was not standing on 
defendant's winch when the control mechanism was triggered. 
The impact of such newly discovered evidence is obvious. 
Should the jury have plaintiff's actual, though suppressed, 
subconscious memory of the accident sequence before it, it 
would be seen that such memory was, and the erroneous memory 
testified to at trial was not, consistent with the physical 
evidence. A finding of misuse or assumption of risk, considering 
that evidence, would be inconceivable. 
At trial the only evidence that plaintiff was standing 
on the winch came from the plaintiff himself. This new evidence, 
which had been locked in plaintiff's subconscious mind and 
effectively hidden from both plaintiff and his counsel, clearly 
demonstrates that plaintiff's testimony at trial to that effect 
was the result of an imperfect conscious memory of the traumatic 
events he experienced. The subconscious memory is recognized 
as being a far more reliable repository of suppressed events. 
Certainly, such evidence could not have been reasonably discovered 
by plaintiff or his counsel. Neither had any idea that plaintiffis 
conscious memory was faulty until after the trial. Such critical 
and newly discovered evidence clearly falls with in the contempla-
tion of Rule 59(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The primary 
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object of our system of justice is to find the truth, and 
Rule 59 reflects that objective by providing, as this court 
has often held, that where new evidence was indeed undis-
coverable and could lead to a different outcome, motions for 
new trial are to be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully submits that the 
District Court erred prejudicially and that justice requires 
this court to reverse the Judgment and Order entered below 
and remand to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this Honorable Court's decision. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
211 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-0181 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant were personally served upon 
Moffat, Welling & Paulsen, attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 
day of July, 1980. 
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